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This article is dedicated to examining the changes in the political attitudes related to national 
populism in the European public opinion. The research hypothesis is that the “revival of 
nationalism” over the last years is due to the rise not in nationalist attitudes as such but in the 
strength of their intercorrelations with the political attitudes national populism is frequently 
attributed to – the growing disappointment with democratic ideal, its country-specific 
implementations, a country’s political system, and the government. The hypothesis is tested by 
means of a quantitative comparative analysis of the data of the two most recent waves of the 
European Values Study collected in 2008 and in 2017. The results show the relevance of these 
correlations by revealing the countries with national populist governments, contrary to other post-
Socialist countries, to showcase increased positive correlations between national pride and 
satisfaction with a country’s political system and confidence in government. These findings 
support the notion that in Europe, national populism is largely due to the East-West divide not in 
ideals and aspirations, but in the relative success in their fulfillment.  
 





The upsurge of national populism became a major issue in the global 
political sphere over the last few years.
1
 Initially marked with the success of 
Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign and Brexit, it was 
later continued with the electoral successes of Boris Johnson in the UK and Jair 
Bolsonaro in Brazil. In many EU countries, right-wing populist parties, as well 
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**  Marharyta Fabrykant is a Senior Research Fellow at the Laboratory for Comparative 
Studies of Mass Consciousness, National Research University Higher School of 
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Organizational Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Belarusian State 
University, Minsk, Belarus (marharyta.fabrykant@gmail.com). 
1  Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal 
Democracy (London: Penguin UK, 2018). 
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as moderate conservatives with an emphasis on national identity issues in their 
agenda, enjoyed an increase in their public support. Despite the proliferation of 
research on nations and national identity over the last decades,
2
 this revival of 
nationalism came as a surprise. While the initial notion of globalization erasing 
nationality in the near future was abandoned quite some time ago, it gave way 
to expectations of more sophisticated, hybrid post nationalist identities.
3
 This 
contrast raises a question of whether what we are witnessing in the pubic 
political life directly mirrors individual attitudes at the microlevel. Or is the 
relation between the two more complicated?    
The research presented in this paper aims at addressing this question by 
means of a quantitative comparative analysis of the political attitudes 
substantively related to national populism and operationalized by means of the 
survey data from the two waves of the European Values Study collected in 2008 
and 2017 – before and during the revival of nationalism. The added value of the 
research is that it reveals the dynamics of attitudes related to national populism 
in Europe to be not a net increase in nationalism as such but a shift in its 
relation to the general satisfaction with a country’s political system and the state 
of affairs with democracy. The research findings shed new light on the 
attitudinal dimension of Europe’s East-West divide and its policy implications. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides 
theoretical grounds for the research by addressing the literature on the varieties 
of nationalism and the available explanations of the current brand of national 
populism and then presenting the research rationale and hypothesis. The data 
and methods section contains a detailed description of the survey items used to 
operationalize the relevant political attitudes and the procedure of data analysis. 
The subsequent section presents the obtained results reflecting dynamics in the 
political attitudes and their intercorrelations. The final section presents a 
discussion of the research findings, their main theoretical takeaways, and 
conceptual and policy implications.    
 
 
National Populism as a Variety of “Bad” Nationalism 
 
The current debate on national populism echoes much of what was 
written about nationalism in various times and places in the past. While the 
reappearance of nationalism at present came unexpectedly, the properties of this 
particular kind of nationalism appear ready-made in multiple theories and 
                                               
2  Bart Bonikowski, “Nationalism in Settled Times,” Annual Review of Sociology 42 (2016): 
427-449. 
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Nationalism and Postnationalism (NYC: Springer, 2010). 
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sharing a strong normative stance. Many academic works on the subject share a 
marked evaluative emphasis, which, at least in the works published after the 
Second World War, is almost universally negative for a variety of reasons. In 
this article, this normatively negative notion of nationalism as a problem to be 
solved or avoided is referred to as “bad” nationalism to be distinguished from a 
value-neutral approach toward nationalism attempted in this research. The 
contemporary explanations of the ongoing revival of nationalism rely on those 
earlier theories of “bad” nationalism, and especially on their descriptions of its 
internal structure.  
What makes nationalism “bad”? To begin with, there are two uses of the 
term. In nations and nationalism studies, nationalism stands for an essentialist 
belief in nation-states and national identities as necessary, natural, and 
unquestionably important.
4
 Nationalism thus defined comprises not so much 
specific political attitudes as a general vision of the world,
5
 perceptions of social 
ties beyond small communities,
6
 and discursive structures deeply entrenched in 
everyday parlance.
7
 Conversely, the other way of defining nationalism, 
widespread in dictionary definitions beyond the academia
8
 but also in some 
areas of academic research beyond nations and nationalism studies,
9
 treats it as 
a specific attitude, namely exclusion, rejection, and general hostility as a default 
treatment of the ethnonational other. The others may be external (citizens of 
other nation-states), internal (ethnic minority members), or willing to move 
from one category to the other (immigrants or expats and, especially of late, 
elites accused of cosmopolitanism causing them to abandon their duty to the 
nation). This definition of nationalism, unlike the first one, has obvious 
embedded normative implications – first, because of its destructive 
consequences amply supported by historical evidence and second, because of its 
alleged irrationality, understood as its supporters’ disregard of these 
consequences. Thus, “bad” nationalism is a kind of outgroup favoritism 
different from its other kinds only by its object, not by its essence. 
This duality of neutral and “bad” shapes much of the research on 
nationalism. The question about the origins of “bad” nationalism, such as the 
current national populism, is ultimately a question as to whether nationalism 
neutrally defined contains inherent and inevitable seeds of exclusion and if so, 
                                               
4  Yael Tamir, “The enigma of nationalism,” World Politics 47, no. 3 (1995): 418-440. 
5  Anthony D Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the 
Reconstruction of Nations,” Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1 (1995): 3-23. 
6  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 2006). 
7  Michael Billig, Banal nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
8  Merriam-Webster, Nationalism, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism. 
9  Eldad Davidov, “Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism: A Longitudinal Test of 
Comparability in 22 Countries with the ISSP,” International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 23, no 1 (2010): 88-103. 
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under what conditions these seeds sprout. The available answers are as follows. 
First, the ascribed irrationality leads to a notion of nationalism as a flexible and 
near-universal instrument with a potential of lending some of its emotional 
attraction to more cerebral and therefore at the same time better grounded and 
“colder” political ideologies. The literature ranges from Hobsbawm’s classic
10
 
on the appropriation of the initially romantic revolutionary nationalism by the 
conservative elites in the mid-nineteenth century to the recent suggestions that 
liberals would do well to appropriate some kind of “mild” nationalism to 
counter national populists.
11
 The weak spot of this approach is that it fails to 
explain why not all attempts to instrumentalize nationalism were equally 
successful. Second, as follows from the social identity theory,
12
 national 
identification, same as any other division of society into us and them, inevitably 
leads to outgroup discrimination however flimsy the grounds of this division. 
This approach’s recipe against “bad” nationalism is to supplement nationality 
with other, partly but not wholly overlapping and/or overarching identities. This 
kind of post-nationalist, if not downright cosmopolitan and multicultural 
identities is what globalization was expected to bring about naturally; instead of 
this remedy against nationalism, we got a reinstatement of national populism 
itself.  Third, a considerable body of theorizing and, especially of late, 
quantitative empirical research rests on the statement that nationalism can be 
not only “bad” or neutral but “good” – conducive to or inspired by positively 
evaluated phenomena such as social solidarity, democracy, or economic growth 
(via mass mobilization). Contrary to the instrumentalist approach, this view 
ascribes the emergence of “bad” or “good” nationalism not to contingent 
choices made by political agents but to structural features of societies and their 
political systems. Although massively criticized for oversimplification, this 
approach, probably more than the other two, inspired the existing explanations 
of national populism, not least many of their limitations and drawbacks, as 
unpacked in the next section of the paper.     
 
 
National Populism: Why Now? 
 
The lack of predictions prior to the revival of nationalism contrasts a 
panoply of post-hoc explanations, especially after the 2016 US presidential 
elections when the extent of national populism, its global spread, and the 
                                               
10  Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
11  Erica Benner, “Can Nationalism Save Democracy?,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 3 
(2020): 534-537. 
12  Rupert Brown, “The Social Identity Approach: Appraising the Tajfellian Legacy,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology 59, no. 1 (2020): 5-25. 
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gravity of its impact became apparent. This recognition of the revival of 
nationalism and its negative evaluation come to the forefront in the literature on 
the issue and overshadow the less obvious and more subtle varieties in the 
suggested causes. The key differences in the approaches to national populism 
become visible when viewed via the previously outlined differentiation between 
the three notions of “bad” nationalism. 
The instrumentalist approach found its application in the idea that 
national populism expresses not so much nationalist attitudes as dissatisfaction 
with the mainstream political elites.
13
 According to this version, the secondary, 
instrumental role of nationalism is twofold. On the one hand, populist political 
actors made use of nationalist rhetoric to attract and mobilize those dissatisfied 
with the ruling elites.
14
 On the other hand, those who answered this call granted 
their support to nationalist forces not because they wanted a nationalist shift in 
policy but because nationalism being “bad” and supposedly especially hateful to 
the mainstream elites provides a highly efficient way of signaling the request for 
elites not to step down but to reconsider their mode of operation. The question 
within this line of reasoning is whether the alliance of nationalism and populism 
is wholly contingent or whether, according to some of the most acclaimed 
theorists of nationality, Rogers Brubaker, populism is inherently nationalist, as 
expressed in its framing of the ruling elites as the internal “other” akin to 
foreigners proper.
15
  Either way, this version ultimately suggests that the current 
revival of nationalism is due to dissatisfaction with the government and more 
broadly with the current relations of power.  
The second explanation of national populism reflects the notion of 
nationalism as essentially “bad”, potentially or actually, depending on the 
circumstances. In a book with the self-explaining title “Cultural Backlash”,
16
 
Inglehart and Norris attribute the rise of national populism to the general 
conservative reaction against the modernization of values occurring too rapidly 
for some of the more traditionalist parts of the population. In line with 
Inglehart’s modernization theory, nationalism is viewed as a part of the 
traditional value set and follows the same general dynamics.
17
 Most 
importantly, this approach suggests that national populism is not solely about 
negative correlates of nationalism such as xenophobia but also about 
                                               
13  Ryan James Girdusky and Harlan Hill, They’re Not Listening: How the Elites Created the 
National Populist Revolution (NYC: Bombardier Books, 2020). 
14  José Rama and Andrés Santana, “In the Name of the People: Left Populists versus Right 
Populists,” European Politics and Society 21, no. 1 (2020): 17-35. 
15  Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 
(2020): 44-66. 
16  Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian 
Populism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
17  Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping 
the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
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nationalism proper including its core normatively approved components such as 
national pride. These data suggest that the recent success of national populists is 
to some extent due to expanding their agenda beyond mere nativism – the belief 
that each country should be inhabited exclusively by its own “natives” 
indigenous to the area
18
 (how exactly this indigeneity is to be defined, and by 
whom, remains unclear) and not migrants – to embrace a broader range of 
nationalist views. In particular, the nationalist bank of ideas offers an attractive 
view of national identity as valuable not solely for the sake of being “native”, 
and thus not better than national identities “native” to other countries,
19
 but 
because of its allegedly unique positive traits able to inspire pride. Higher levels 
of national pride reflect not merely a neutral approval of the country’s current 
state of affairs but adherence to a value set that in time of backlash comes in a 
particularly sharp and conscious contrast to its liberal alternative. The data show 
this polarization to be particularly strong in the authors’ own country, the US,
20
 
but in Europe, too, national populists seek to combine the anti-migrant agenda 
with the more moderate and ostensibly more neutral national identity attributes 
providing grounds for national pride (e.g. the framing of the migration issue as a 
tradeoff between open borders and welfare state in Sweden). Thus, this 
approach suggests nationalism in the public opinion to be related not just to the 
dissatisfaction with the way things are but also and primarily with certain value 
statements on how things should be. 
The third kind of explanation of national populism relies on uncovering 
not its general causes but internal contradictions in specific countries and 
regions. In a recent widely discussed work, the prototypical region for the 
current wave of “bad” nationalism, if not downright its birthplace, is located in 
Eastern Europe.
21
 The authors claim that for eastern European societies, liberal 
democratic reforms failed to raise the living standards to the level of the western 
European countries and therefore proved a disappointment. In consequence, 
many eastern Europeans decided to abandon aspirations for improving the 
living conditions in their home countries and opted instead for improving the 
living standards for themselves by migration westwards. Faced with the massive 
migration, as the argument goes, those who stay, which may be due to a variety 
of reasons, face a certain cognitive dissonance and need to somehow justify 
their choice. Ethnic nationalism provides a ready-made justification that fits 
                                               
18  Eirikur Bergmann, Neo-Nationalism: The Rise of Nativist Populism (NYC: Springer 
Nature, 2020). 
19  Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
20  Daniel DellaPosta, “Pluralistic Collapse: The ‘Oil Spill’ Model of Mass Opinion 
Polarization,” American Sociological Review 85, no. 3 (2020): 207-536. 
21  Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. The Light That Failed: A Reckoning (London: Penguin 
UK, 2019). 
Dynamics of Attitudinal Dimensions of National Populism in Europe, 2008-2017 163 
 







well into the pattern of disappointed expectations with its future-oriented and 
visionary civic counterpart. For this reason, unlike in Western Europe, in some 
eastern European countries nationalist political actors not only increased their 
electoral support but also gained or consolidated power, the two most widely 
mentioned cases in this regard being Poland and Hungary respectively.
22
  
Interestingly, within this logic, national populists coming to power in other parts 
of the world, such as the US, owe their success to the same dynamics and 
unexpectedly emulate Eastern Europe. Thus, national populism appears out of 
resentment of the gap between expectations and reality. Importantly, unlike in 
the modernization theory, the object of this disappointment is not the 
democratic ideal itself but the perceived deficiency of its implementation in a 
given time and place.  
Taken together, all these approaches relate the revival of nationalism not 
necessarily to the growth of national sentiments as such but primarily to their 
coming to the forefront due to an association with certain political attitudes. The 
latter include satisfaction with the government and a country’s political system 
in general, the ascribed positive value of democracy, and the approval of the 
state of affairs with democracy in one’s own country. If so, the rise of national 
populism would be likely to increase satisfaction in the political system in those 
who share traditional nationalist attitudes such as strong national pride. On the 
other hand, national populism as an alternative to liberal democracy may further 
reinforce the disappointment with democracy, both as an ideal and its 
implementation. These corollaries of the main theoretical approaches to national 
populism are summarized in the following research hypothesis: the change in 
the political attitudes related to national populism lies not in the net growth or 
decline in national pride, but in the increase in the correlation between national 
pride and satisfaction with the government and the political system and the 
decrease in the correlation between national pride and approval of democracy 
and its country-specific implementations. Empirical testing of this hypothesis 
was conducted by means of the data and methods described in the next section. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The research is based on the data of the two last waves of the European 
Values Study. The European Values Study (further referred to as the EVS for 
short) is a major social survey conducted every 10 years in European countries 
both within and outside the European Union and covering public opinion on a 
variety of issues including a large set of items dedicated to political attitudes. 
                                               
22  Jakub Szabó, “First As Tragedy, Then As Farce: a Comparative Study of Right-wing Populism 
in Hungary and Poland,” Journal of Comparative Politics 13, no. 2 (2020): 24-42. 
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The most recent, fifth round of data collection was started in 2017 (this wave of 
the EVS and the dataset containing its results are further referred to as the EVS-
2017)
23
 and currently covers 33 countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Switzerland, Czechia / 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, the 
Netherlands, North Macedonia / Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
The previous, fourth wave of the European Values Study was conducted in 
2008-2009 (further referred to as the EVS-2008)
24
 and covers the following 47 
countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia / Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia / Former 
Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (the names of the 32 countries 
represented in both the EVS 2008 and EVS-2017 are highlighted in italics). The 
sample sizes for each country vary from 1000 to 1200 respondents depending 
on the population size.   
The political attitudes pertinent to the present research are operationalized 
in the EVS by means of the following survey items. National pride corresponds 
in both EVS-2017 and EVS-2008 to the direct question: “How proud are you to 
be a [given respondent’s country] citizen?” with the answer options of “very 
proud”, “quite proud”, ‘not very proud”, and “not at all proud”. The question 
about the general attitude towards democracy is formulated in the EVS-2017 as 
follows: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed 
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is ‘not at all important’ and 10 
means ‘absolutely important’ what position would you choose?” with the 
answer options presented as a 10-point ordered scale. The corresponding 
question in the EVS-2008, albeit substantively probing into the same attitudinal 
domain, is stated differently: “I’m going to read off some things that people 
sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if 
you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of 
them? … Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of 
government”. This formulation reflects a preference for democracy, and the 
                                               
23  EVS (2020): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017). GESIS Data 
Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13511. 
24  EVS (2016): European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data 
Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Data File Version 4.0.0 (2016-04-15), 
doi:10.4232/1.12458. 
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corresponding item from the EVS-2017 measures the importance of democracy, 
which also by definition implies the positive attitude towards democracy and its 
preference to other options a country could have instead. Ultimately, both items 
measure the extent of approval of democracy in general irrespective of its 
specific implementations in a respondent’s country or elsewhere.  
The questions about attitudes towards the current state of affairs with 
democracy and the political system of a specific country are as follows. First, 
both waves of the EVS contain a question about the opinion on the situation 
with democracy in a country of a respondent’s residence. In the EVS-2017, this 
question is represented with a 10-point ordered scale: “And how democratically 
is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
means that it is ‘not at all democratic’ and 10 means that it is ‘completely 
democratic’, what position would you choose?” In the EVS-2008, the prompt to 
evaluate the state of affairs with democracy is captured in the following way: 
“On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?”. The 
question about satisfaction with the political system in general in the EVS-2017 
is worded similarly to the question about the state of affairs with democracy and 
similarly has the 10-point ordered scale of responses ranging from 1 – “not 
satisfied at all” to 10 – “completely satisfied”. The EVS-2008 also offers the 10-
point scale for this survey item, but with a different wording: “people have 
different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for 
rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good.” 
Finally, the EVS -2017 and EVS-2008 both have a set of questions about 
confidence in various institutions including the government with the same 
wording: “Please indicate how much confidence you have in… government” 
and the same answer options: ”a great deal”, “quite a lot”, “not very much”, and 
“none at all”. 
The data were analyzed as follows. First, descriptive statistics were 
computed for each of the five survey items separately for the EVS-2017 and 
EVS-2008. Mean scores for each country were computed on the 10-point scales, 
and within-country frequency distributions, on the questions with four answer 
options. Then the shift in attitudes in each country between 2008 and 2017 was 
quantified.  For national pride, the level of national pride was estimated as the 
ratio of those either “very proud” or “quite proud”, and the shift in the level of 
national pride was computed simply by subtracting this ratio on the EVS-2008 
data from the ratio of the EVS-2017 for each country represented in both waves 
of the survey. A similar procedure was employed for another item represented 
in the same way in both survey waves, confidence in government, with the 
extent of confidence measured as the ratio of the respondents who reported 
having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence.  The other three items 
included in this research – approval of democracy, evaluation of the state of 
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affairs with democracy in a respondent’s country, and satisfaction with a 
country’s political system – have different sets of responses in the EVS-2017 and 
the EVS-2008. This difference makes it impossible to measure the shift in 
opinions directly, because the country scores have to be aggregated as ratios for 
the EVS-2008 and as means for the EVS-2017. To overcome this obstacle, the 
country ranks within each survey wave were derived from the sorted initial scores 
(e.g. the rank of 1 indicates that the country has the highest score on a respective 
attitude in a given survey wave, the rank of 2, the second-highest score etc.). 
These ranks could then be compared across the survey waves. To make these 
results more intuitively accessible, and since the smaller number corresponds to 
the higher rank, the country ranks for the earlier wave, the EVS-2017, were 
subtracted from those for the EVS-2008, and not vice versa. As a result, the 
positive scores on this rank shift indicate an increase in a given parameter in 
relation to the other countries (e.g. an increase in satisfaction with a country’s 
political system), and negative scores, a decrease. To make these results 
compatible across all the variables, the ranks were also computed for national 
pride and confidence in government in addition to the shifts in absolute scores. 
At the second stage of the research, the shift in correlations between national 
pride and each of the other four attitudes was estimated. Spearman’s nonparametric 
correlation coefficients were computed for the whole dataset and within each 
country separately for the EVS-2017 and the EVS-2008.  Then the shifts in each of 
the four correlations were estimated by subtracting the within-country correlation 
coefficients computed on the EVS-2008 data from those on the EVS-2017 data. 







The initial question of this research is whether national pride in Europe 
over the last decade has been on the increase. Tables 1 and 2 present the within-
country distributions of the national pride variable in 2008 and 2017 
respectively. These results show that in all the countries without exception in 
both waves of the survey the distributions are heavily skewed, with the vast 
majority displaying strong national pride. The ratio of those “very proud” or 
“quite proud” (as opposed to “not very proud” or “not proud at all”) falls under 
3/4 of the sample in only two countries in 2008 (Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
North Macedonia) and only for one country in 2017 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
and sometimes rises above 95%. Table 3. containing the data on the countries 
covered by both survey waves and allowing comparison across time. shows on 
average only a very slight increase of a little under 2 percent points in national 
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pride between 2008 and 2017: the mean percentage of those “very proud” or 
“quite proud” was 87.05% in 2008 and 88.90% in 2017. This change in the 
mean score for the whole sample, however, shows a somewhat different picture 
when disentangled. As can be seen in figure 1, the number of countries with the 
net increase in national pride between 2008 and 2017 is over two times higher 
than the number of countries where national pride decreased. The size of these 
changes is considerable and ranges from about -13 to about 13 percent points. 
Interestingly, the most marked change in both directions, in absolute scores as 
well as in the ranks relative to the scores of other countries (figure 2) is 
observed mainly in the Western Balkans. They are disproportionally strongly 
represented on both extremes with a curious exception of Serbia, which until 
recently was considered the hotbed of nationalism in the region.  
The attitudes towards democracy in general irrespective of the situation 
in a given country demonstrate the same skewness with an even stronger 
preference for higher degrees of approval. In 2008, the ratio of respondents who 
either “agree strongly” or merely “agree” that democracy is preferable to all 
other forms of government is over 3/4 of the sample in each country and 
averages 90.25% (table 3). In 2017, the mean score of the ascribed importance 
of having a democratic political system ranges between 7.27 and 9.67 on a 10-
point scale (table 4). The countries with the highest importance of democracy 
are mostly Nordic, and as many as the lowest 15 positions on the ascribed 
importance of democracy belong to post-Socialist countries. Same as for 
national pride, the results on approval of democracy show a slight overall 
change in the average high scores in both waves concealing substantial shifts in 
many countries. As seen in figure 3, the decrease in the importance of 
democracy compared to other European countries is observed primarily in some 
post-Socialist countries, while the most marked relative increase appears in 
Hungary – the country widely criticized precisely as an epitome of national 
populism within the EU, with Poland, viewed similarly, not far behind.       
The evaluation of the state of affairs with democracy in one’s own 
country scores considerably lower on average and varies much more strongly 
than the general attitude towards democracy as such. In 2008, the ratio of 
roughly 3/4  of the sample either “strongly satisfied” or “rather satisfied” with 
democracy in their country is not the lowest, as for those expressing approval of 
democracy, but the highest ratio, with the lowest one as small as 9.5% (table 5). 
Similarly, in 2017, the mean score on evaluation of the level of democracy in a 
respondent’s country is 5.95 out of 10 within a wide range between 3.65 and 
8.54 (table 6). Same as for approval of democracy, the countries with the 
highest scores are Nordic and the lowest, post-Socialist. The changes in the 
country ranks show an even stronger shift than for the importance of 
democracy, ranging from -21 to 17. These changes are quite large when 
evaluated against the highest possible absolute score of 31 (a difference 
between the highest rank of 1 and the lowest rank of 32). As seen in figure 4, 
the most pronounced relative decrease in the evaluation of the state of affairs 
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with democracy in one’s own country is observed in post-Socialist countries, 
which means that the initial relatively low scores got even lower.  
Satisfaction with the political system, in general, is slightly lower in its 
mean, minimum and maximum scores than the evaluation of democracy and, as 
can be seen in tables 7 and 8, does not demonstrate a statistically significant 
shift between the two survey waves in either direction. The average level of 
satisfaction with the political system is a little under 5 on a 10-point scale, 
which, considering that the scale begins at 1 and not 0, is below the midpoint. 
The country-specific shifts in this score are also rather small and range between 
-1.35 and 1.77 (figure 5). As can be seen in figure 6, however, these relatively 
small changes in absolute values reflect rather significant relocation of the 
countries’ relative ranking positions. The countries appearing on the two 
extremes are quite similar to those for the evaluation with democracy, with the 
most pronounced decrease in post-Socialist countries and the second strongest 
increase, in both absolute and relative scores, in Hungary.  Unlike for national 
pride, the number of countries with growth in the average satisfaction with the 
country’s political system only slightly exceeds that of countries where the 
satisfaction with the political system declined.  
Confidence in government is on average lower than satisfaction with the 
political system as a whole. In 2008, the ratio of respondents with either “a great deal” 
or “quite a lot” of confidence ranges from 13.4% to 67.7% with a mean score of 
37.47% (table 9), and in 2017, between 8.74% and 68.62 (with 92.62% in Azerbaijan 
making this country case a marked outlier) and the mean of 34.52% (with Azerbaijan 
included, 36.28%) (table 10). Same as for the other variables, the minute change in 
the mean scores between the two survey waves hides a number of considerable shifts 
in certain countries. In absolute terms, these changes range from -26.64 to 22.29 
percentage points (figure 7) and in relative terms, from -17 to 17 rank points (figure 
8). The distribution of countries is very similar to the previously observed patterns, 
with the prevailing decline in some of the post-Socialist countries and the strongest 
growth in confidence in government, in both relative and absolute terms, in Hungary. 
Taken together, these results demonstrate considerable consistency across countries at 
the aggregate level. To find out whether the same consistency is observed at the 




Correlations between national pride and the other political attitudes 
covered in this research demonstrate to what extent a simultaneous shift in the 
same direction (e.g. an increase in national pride and satisfaction with a 
country’s political system) reflects the change of attitudes in same people and 
thus shows that the two dynamics are part of the same process. Table 11 
presents an intercorrelation matrix of all the five variables for the whole dataset 
without differentiation between countries.  As predicted, all the correlations are 
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positive and, unsurprisingly given the large sample size, statistically significant. 
The correlations between national pride and each of the other attitudes are rather 
weak, which is again to be expected given the large and diverse sample. The 
difference between the correlation coefficients for the EVS-2008 and EVS-2017 
is not very pronounced and so should be interpreted with caution. The direction 
of the shift matches the research hypothesis for one variable out of four: in 
2017, national pride is slightly weaklier correlated with the evaluation of the 
state of things with democracy. Contrary to what was expected, the correlation 
between national pride and satisfaction with the political system and confidence 
in government also slightly weakened. Interestingly, no decrease and even a 
very slight growth are observed for the correlation between national pride and 
the importance of democracy. Of all the other intercorrelations, those between 
the substantively close measurements of approval of the country’s political 
sphere are the most strongly intercorrelated. This consistency provides 
additional evidence of the validity of the data.  
Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy within 
each country range from -0.100 to 0.223 in the EVS-2008 (table 12) and from 
0.013 to 0.218 in EVS-2017. (table 13) It is worth noting that the two countries 
with a statistically significant and negative correlation in the EVS-2008, North 
Macedonia and Norway, are also presented in the wave of 2017, but with positive 
correlations. Thus, an important takeaway from the results appears to be that 
national pride is positively correlated with the importance of democracy in nearly 
all countries where the correlation is statistically significant, even though the 
correlation is not that strong. The shifts in these correlations between the two 
waves of the survey are, as shown in figure 9, considerable when compared to the 
absolute values of the correlation coefficients themselves. In the majority of the 
countries covered by the survey, this shift is in the positive direction signifying 
that in most countries the correlation between national pride and importance of 
democracy between 2008 and 2017 grew stronger, especially in the countries 
where it used to be negative. Interestingly, a strong positive shift is observed in 
Russia, where the correlation between national pride and the importance of 
democracy in 2017 is stronger than in any other country in the sample. 
The correlations between national pride and the evaluation of the state of 
affairs with democracy vary within a larger range than the correlations with 
approval of democracy in general in both survey waves (tables 14 and 15). The 
similarity between the two sets of correlations lies in the fact that all the 
statistically significant within-country correlations are positive. Again similarly, 
the changes in both directions are considerable when evaluated against the 
absolute values of the correlation coefficients. The numbers of the countries 
with positive and negative changes, unlike for the correlations between national 
pride and the importance of democracy, are compatible (figure 10). Differently 
from the changes in evaluation of democracy per se, changes in its correlations 
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with national pride reflect no obvious pattern of distinction between the 
countries with the net increase and decrease: both post-Socialist and the western 
European countries are rather evenly represented among those with the largest 
increase and the largest decrease in the strength of the correlation.   
The correlations between national pride and satisfaction with the political 
system are positive in all the countries covered by both waves of the survey and 
for the most part statistically significant (tables 16 and 17). The range within 
which the correlation coefficients vary is considerable, especially in 2008. The 
changes in the strength of correlation are also quite pronounced (figure 11). 
Same as for the correlations between the national pride and the evaluation of the 
state of affairs with democracy, the numbers of countries with the positive and 
the negative directions of these changes are roughly equal. Unlike for the 
correlations between national pride and each of the two democracy related 
attitudes, it is interesting that here the countries with the largest net positive 
change are Hungary and Poland – the two EU members most strongly criticized 
for their governments’ lapsing into national populism.  
The within-country correlations between national pride and confidence in 
government follow more or less the same pattern (tables 18 and 19). The near-
lacking average change in the strength of positive within-country correlations 
conceals the substantial changes in specific countries, with the near-equal breakup 
of the sample of countries into those with the net growth and the net decline in the 
strength of correlation (figure 12). Most importantly, the largest shifts in the 
correlation between national pride and confidence in government in both directions 
occur mostly in the same countries that the largest shifts in the correlations between 
national pride and satisfaction with a country’s political system in general.  
Taken together, the research results create a comprehensive picture of 
changes in political attitudes operationalizing nationalism populism and their 
interrelations. The patterns visible in the research findings and their 





The research findings demonstrate several regularities in the extent and 
direction of change in national pride, approval of democracy, and satisfaction 
with the government and their intercorrelations. These regularities do not 
wholly match the research hypothesis and even less so, the contrary and simpler 
notion about a direct projection of the populist nationalism onto the microlevel.  
First, there is no visible pan-European growth, nor a decline, in national 
pride or any of the other political attitudes covered by the research. National 
pride was quite strong in Europe already in 2008, and the wave of national 
populism in the public political discourse neither resulted from nor led to its 
upsurge. Similarly, the survey data give no evidence of a massive falling out of 
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love with democracy, be it the democratic ideal or its implementation in a given 
country, or a disappointment with a country’s political system in general 
irrespective of its level of democracy. Nor was there a significant all-European 
change in the degree of relevance of a country’s political system as grounds of 
pride in belonging to the country. Finally, the lack of any significant shift in the 
strength of correlation between national pride and importance of democracy 
contradicts the theoretical assumption that ongoing wave of national populism 
marks a disappointment with the national-democratic ideal of the “velvet 
revolutions” of the late 1980s. Instead, the pan-European data, with no 
differentiation between countries, demonstrate consistency and temporal 
stability in the views on the significance of the state of things with the country’s 
political system and specifically its democracy as grounds of national pride. The 
fact that all the correlations are positive shows that, unlike for some more 
mundane issues more closely related to everyday life, such as socioeconomic 
development, a relative underperformance in democracy compared to other 
countries does not create a feeling of ressentiment described by Greenfeld
25
 and 
a resulting compensatory upsurge in national pride. This consistency may be at 
least partly due to the variability in the popular notions of democracy.  
According to a research by Welzel and Moreno,
26
 democracy, again unlike more 
down-to-earth values directly related to material wellbeing, because of its 
general normative acceptance may mean to laypeople anything regarded as 
good and desirable up to the notions not directly implied by the definition of 
democracy, such as order and stability, or even at odds with it, such as strong 
leadership. The positive correlation between national pride and approval of 
democracy clearly demonstrates that, at least in the contemporary Europe if not 
in other parts of the world, the choice in favor of granting support to national 
populists is not a choice between nationalism and democracy.  
This general picture of consistency and stability presented by the data not 
only contradicts some of the simpler explanations of the upsurge in national 
populism but also gives no evidence that any such surge took place. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that an increase in popularity of the national 
populist political parties and leaders should be attributed exclusively to 
superficial and transient reasons such as more efficient techniques of their 
political campaigns with little effect of or impact on the mass political attitudes. 
The evidence of the attitudinal shifts substantively relevant to the increase in 
                                               
25  Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
26  Christian Welzel and Alejandro Moreno, “Enlightening People: The Spark of 
Emancipative Values,” in The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive 
Citizens, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015): 59-89. 
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popularity of nationalist political actors shows itself in the differences between 
countries.  
The research findings show that the small and hardly changing pan-
European correlations conceal a panoply of country-specific shifts in separately 
taken attitudes and their intercorrelations, which are mutually levelled out when 
regarded as a whole. To begin with the most striking pieces of evidence, the two 
countries with the strongest increase in the correlations between national pride 
and satisfaction with the political system, and also the second and third 
strongest increase in the strength of correlation between national pride and 
confidence in the government, are Hungary and Poland, both frequently treated 
as the major cases of national populism within the EU. These two countries also 
demonstrate a significant albeit slightly less spectacular increase in the 
correlation between national pride and approval of democracy. These dynamics 
provides further evidence of the representations of democracy in the mass 
consciousness as something vaguely defined yet certainly positive. 
Accordingly, at least in some cases, the ascribed characteristic of a political 
system as democratic in a survey may amount to a general approval, probably 
with some specific features associated with democracy (again not necessarily 
those encompassed by its accepted definitions) coming to the forefront in a 
respondent’s mind. In addition to this increase in correlations, the research 
findings also show a considerable growth in the level of satisfaction with the 
political system in general and the state of affairs with democracy and 
confidence in the government in Hungary – albeit a very slight growth in 
Poland. Importantly, despite the increased correlations, the level of national 
pride per se did not grow in either of these countries to any compatible extent. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that, at the very least in the most widely 
debated country cases, national populism has less to do with nationalism than 
the general attitude towards the country’s political sphere.  
This country-specific dynamic gains additional significance when the two 
country cases are juxtaposed not just with the rest of the sample, but specifically 
with other post-Socialist states. The research findings show that post-Socialist 
countries, both within and outside the EU, score lower on all the three estimates 
of satisfaction with the country’s political sphere. This observation applies to 
both waves of the survey and is further strengthened by the changes between the 
two. As shown by the research findings, post-Socialist countries are 
disproportionately highly represented among those where the satisfaction with 
the political system and confidence in the government decreased, between 2008 
and 2017. Against this gap in the level of satisfaction with all things political 
grown wider in the last decade, Poland and Hungary with their net growth 
present an exceptional case. The accompanying growth in the strength of 
correlations between approval of the state of things in the political sphere with 
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national pride shows that this exception has something to do with national 
populism.        
In a nutshell, these takeaways from the research findings lead to a rather 
pessimistic conclusion that national populism has lately appeared the only 
efficient way out of the dissatisfaction with the political sphere in post-Socialist 
countries. This evidence corroborates the theoretical assumption about Eastern 
Europe as the region overwhelmed with disappointment. Needless to say, this 
way of coping is efficient solely in alleviating the mass dissatisfaction with a 
country’s political system, not in addressing any objective grounds of this 
dissatisfaction, so the effect on the public opinion is unlikely to last for long.  
What might come to replace national populism once its effect is over? A 
probable scenario seems to be an oscillation between attempts to return to the 
way things were before the upsurge of nationalism, thus reproducing the initial 
situation of dissatisfaction, and the new bouts of national populism. A possible 
alternative, stems from the fact that, as the research results demonstrate, post-
Socialist countries do not differ from the rest of Europe in the popular notions 
on the relevance of democracy as grounds for national pride or approval of a 
country’s political system (as operationalized by the correlations). Hence, the 
rise in national populism in post-Socialist countries does not reflect a 
disappointment in westernization. The grounds of disappointment are not the 
Western ideals of democracy but what is perceived as the intermediary results 
of their implementation. Accordingly, a debate about countering national 
populism might be reframed as debate not about goals and the essential east-
west divide but about means of implementing the shared ideals under varying 
circumstances and in the changing global environment.  
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Table 1. Within-country distribution of Responses on National Pride, European Values Study-








not at all 
proud 
Ireland 77.45 21.28 0.85 0.43 
Kosovo 88.38 10.23 0.98 0.41 
Malta 72.71 23.94 2.87 0.48 
Northern Ireland 54.60 41.54 2.14 1.71 
Georgia 65.43 30.60 3.76 0.21 
Poland 50.32 45.42 3.82 0.43 
Turkey 73.98 20.99 3.66 1.38 
Cyprus 70.54 24.39 4.33 0.74 
Portugal 65.20 29.67 3.80 1.33 
Greece 66.93 27.75 4.24 1.08 
Slovenia 62.83 30.70 5.49 0.98 
Finland 56.20 37.04 6.30 0.46 
Iceland 61.58 31.17 6.36 0.89 
Spain 57.21 35.44 4.41 2.94 
Luxembourg 51.56 40.05 5.55 2.84 
Russian Federation 48.46 43.02 6.98 1.54 
Norway 59.92 31.42 7.39 1.26 
Great Britain 54.11 37.04 6.98 1.87 
Slovak Republic 40.66 50.35 7.65 1.33 
France 37.04 53.84 7.12 2.00 
Denmark 49.20 41.61 8.35 0.84 
Croatia 41.82 48.35 8.46 1.38 
Northern Cyprus 51.59 38.26 6.96 3.19 
Armenia 64.74 24.95 7.08 3.23 
Austria 47.67 41.60 6.85 3.88 
Macedonia 53.34 35.23 5.97 5.47 
Belgium 29.43 58.23 10.14 2.20 
Belarus 34.87 52.74 8.75 3.65 
Sweden 45.49 41.94 11.52 1.06 
Albania 42.47 44.93 11.58 1.03 
Italy 45.91 41.47 9.92 2.70 
Switzerland 44.70 42.50 11.30 1.50 
Romania 38.45 47.86 11.13 2.57 
Netherlands 28.28 57.78 11.31 2.63 
Serbia 42.51 42.94 11.47 3.08 
Hungary 36.08 49.13 12.38 2.41 
Czech Republic 32.85 51.19 14.21 1.75 
Moldova 25.97 56.79 14.85 2.39 
Montenegro 33.97 48.65 11.89 5.48 
Estonia 37.68 43.76 13.63 4.93 
Bulgaria 34.31 46.22 16.18 3.29 
Latvia 32.35 46.23 17.44 3.98 
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Germany 20.38 55.40 17.92 6.30 
Ukraine 37.39 36.96 19.47 6.18 
Lithuania 22.65 49.66 20.58 7.12 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 29.08 31.55 28.17 11.20 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 2. Within-country distribution of Responses on National Pride, European Values Study-
2017 (sorted in the descending order of the ratio of those “very proud” or “quite proud”) 
 Country very proud quite proud not very proud not at all proud 
Poland 66.29 30.99 2.42 0.30 
Azerbaijan 67.55 29.61 2.66 0.17 
Finland 68.59 27.93 3.06 0.42 
Norway 67.78 27.59 4.33 0.30 
Iceland 62.32 33.01 3.83 0.83 
Albania 79.06 15.88 4.29 0.77 
Estonia 47.57 46.22 5.32 0.90 
Georgia 68.17 25.31 5.79 0.73 
Montenegro 33.51 59.38 5.83 1.27 
Austria 54.53 38.16 5.16 2.15 
France 51.36 41.19 4.72 2.73 
Denmark 49.61 42.79 6.78 0.81 
Sweden 56.38 35.71 6.77 1.14 
Russia 49.91 42.08 6.02 1.99 
Slovenia 55.68 36.30 6.85 1.17 
Slovakia 35.08 56.31 7.82 0.79 
Belarus 37.02 53.60 7.33 2.05 
Romania 51.16 39.10 7.93 1.81 
Armenia 50.34 39.91 7.13 2.62 
Great Britain 52.47 37.07 8.22 2.25 
Switzerland 44.76 43.28 9.26 2.70 
Hungary 49.25 38.32 10.73 1.70 
Italy 40.23 46.67 11.31 1.79 
Netherlands 33.13 53.50 10.75 2.62 
Spain 43.10 42.39 9.56 4.96 
Serbia 32.04 53.05 12.21 2.70 
Czechia 35.16 49.17 13.46 2.21 
Bulgaria 47.73 36.38 13.62 2.27 
Lithuania 28.66 53.64 15.53 2.18 
Croatia 38.36 42.71 13.88 5.05 
Germany 30.71 47.77 14.13 7.39 
North Macedonia 36.10 39.24 15.14 9.52 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.46 45.60 20.19 5.75 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 1. Changes in the level of national pride (ratio of those “very proud” or “quite proud”) 
between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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Figure 2. Changes in the relative country ranks on national pride between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 3. Within-country distributions of responses on the preference for democracy, European 
Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the ratio of those who either “agree 
strongly” or “agree” that democracy is the nest option) 
 Country agree strongly Agree disagree disagree strongly 
Denmark 76.90 22.35 0.75 0.00 
Cyprus 68.93 27.94 2.59 0.54 
Greece 61.71 34.91 3.25 0.14 
Switzerland 54.64 41.92 3.26 0.17 
Georgia 53.57 42.71 3.57 0.16 
Malta 41.95 54.32 2.93 0.79 
Austria 59.18 37.08 2.95 0.79 
Italy 50.93 45.20 3.65 0.21 
Spain 51.46 44.42 3.55 0.57 
Iceland 40.51 55.29 3.69 0.51 
Finland 40.53 55.19 3.67 0.61 
Sweden 59.75 35.79 3.59 0.87 
Norway 73.54 21.82 3.99 0.65 
Northern Cyprus 44.37 49.23 6.18 0.22 
Germany 45.56 48.00 5.75 0.69 
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Luxembourg 55.08 38.47 5.05 1.40 
France 51.66 41.69 5.69 0.95 
Portugal 28.33 64.94 6.35 0.39 
Netherlands 41.37 51.78 6.18 0.67 
Albania 39.75 53.39 6.15 0.71 
Turkey 44.23 48.73 6.04 1.00 
Northern Ireland 36.41 56.41 6.92 0.26 
Lithuania 21.33 69.21 8.30 1.16 
Slovenia 17.93 72.56 8.65 0.86 
Poland 23.45 66.86 8.73 0.96 
Belgium 41.59 48.41 8.44 1.55 
Slovak Republic 28.13 61.77 8.26 1.83 
Kosovo 61.58 27.92 6.08 4.42 
Belarus 27.68 61.44 9.70 1.18 
Great Britain 36.47 52.25 10.42 0.86 
Estonia 23.17 65.35 10.16 1.32 
Macedonia 37.91 50.60 10.36 1.13 
Armenia 40.06 47.57 10.46 1.91 
Croatia 26.46 61.07 10.96 1.51 
Romania 29.82 57.65 9.92 2.61 
Latvia 19.40 66.24 12.41 1.95 
Montenegro 41.29 44.26 11.79 2.66 
Ireland 34.68 49.82 12.33 3.17 
Serbia 31.37 53.10 12.85 2.69 
Czech Republic 31.65 52.44 13.56 2.35 
Bosnia Herzegovina 32.00 51.42 13.82 2.76 
Bulgaria 28,40 54,30 13,93 3,36 
Hungary 23,82 57,22 16,98 1,97 
Russian Federation 20,71 60,19 16,33 2,78 
Ukraine 24,77 52,04 20,02 3,17 
Moldova 24,96 47,45 21,95 5,64 
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Table 4. Mean scores on the ascribed importance of democracy (1 – “not at all important” to 10 
– “very important”), European Values Study-2017 (sorted in the descending order) 















North Macedonia 8.9 
Georgia 8.87 

















Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 3. Changes in the relative country ranks on approval of democracy between 2008 and 
2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 5. Within-country distributions of responses on evaluation of democracy in one’s own 
country, European Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of 








not at all 
satisfied 
Switzerland 10.61 67.14 19.21 3.03 
Denmark 20.31 55.96 21.20 2.52 
Cyprus 24.04 52.03 19.56 4.37 
Luxembourg 11.44 63.69 20.24 4.63 
Norway 6.33 64.74 27.16 1.77 
Kosovo 29.21 40.86 21.91 8.03 
Malta 12.80 56.58 22.49 8.13 
Sweden 5.31 63.90 25.39 5.41 
Ireland 10.08 53.19 30.48 6.26 
Belarus 12.36 49.92 30.03 7.69 
Belgium 2.81 57.13 32.89 7.17 
Turkey 10.43 47.04 24.74 17.79 
Spain 11.52 45.75 35.25 7.48 
Northern Cyprus 2.74 53.16 31.65 12.45 
Germany 4.84 50.98 36.87 7.31 
Netherlands 3.65 51.33 41.25 3.78 
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Northern Ireland 3.77 51.18 32.55 12.50 
Poland 3.35 50.67 38.24 7.74 
Austria 4.19 49.28 35.60 10.93 
Finland 2.52 50.55 37.16 9.77 
Slovenia 1.88 47.37 44.29 6.47 
Armenia 2.43 45.70 28.99 22.88 
Iceland 2.33 43.52 41.58 12.56 
Estonia 3.36 41.18 42.86 12.61 
Slovak Republic 1.93 41.54 46.54 9.99 
Greece 8.00 35.44 36.92 19.64 
Macedonia 6.18 36.18 36.93 20.71 
Romania 2.36 38.60 46.57 12.47 
Georgia 4.30 35.95 50.04 9.71 
Czech Republic 2.50 37.63 45.18 14.69 
France 2.08 37.63 42.61 17.67 
Portugal 2.57 36.04 41.26 20.12 
Russian Federation 3.97 34.40 47.94 13.70 
Montenegro 5.99 31.31 46.83 15.87 
Italy 2.03 29.86 49.02 19.09 
Lithuania 0.96 30.71 49.63 18.70 
Great Britain 2.73 28.93 52.27 16.07 
Latvia 0.49 28.67 59.39 11.44 
Moldova 1.26 26.30 55.89 16.55 
Croatia 1.03 24.66 55.49 18.82 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 2.80 22.59 47.24 27.37 
Hungary 0.81 19.76 57.65 21.79 
Serbia 1.41 18.34 56.22 24.03 
Albania 1.62 17.60 54.50 26.27 
Ukraine 2.40 14.03 47.60 35.97 
Bulgaria 0.76 8.75 53.79 36.71 
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Table 6. Country mean scores on evaluation of democracy in one’s own country (from 1 – “not 
































North Macedonia 4.05 
Albania 3.97 
Armenia 3.80 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.65 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
 
Dynamics of Attitudinal Dimensions of National Populism in Europe, 2008-2017 183 
 








Figure 4. Changes in the relative country ranks on evaluation of democracy in one’s own 
country between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 7. Country mean scores on rating a country’s political system in one’s own country (from 















Slovak Republic 5.47 
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Russian Federation 5.22 














Northern Cyprus 4.24 














Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 8. Country mean scores on satisfaction with a country’s political system (from 1 – “not 
satisfied at all” to 10 – “completely satisfied”, sorted in the descending order), European 
Values Study-2017 
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North Macedonia 3.39 
Albania 3.26 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.19 
Croatia 2.87 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 5. Changes in the country level of satisfaction with a country’s political system between 
2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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Figure 6. Changes in the relative country ranks on satisfaction with a country’s political system 
between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 9. Within-country distributions of responses on confidence in the government, European 
Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of those with “a great 
deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence) 
Country a great deal quite a lot not very much none at all 
Luxembourg 11.76 55.91 23.92 8.40 
Belarus 11.79 53.23 24.85 10.14 
Kosovo 27.07 37.82 24.94 10.17 
Cyprus 18.66 43.26 26.00 12.08 
Russian Federation 15.55 46.09 25.64 12.71 
Switzerland 8.50 52.36 33.48 5.67 
Denmark 7.20 47.83 36.75 8.22 
Sweden 7.53 46.00 32.81 13.66 
Turkey 20.86 32.10 21.67 25.37 
Armenia 10.26 42.61 24.97 22.16 
Malta 16.16 36.58 26.33 20.93 
Slovak Republic 5.78 46.76 33.29 14.17 
Macedonia 12.84 39.00 26.71 21.45 
Norway 3.99 46.15 38.92 10.94 
Georgia 13.16 35.94 34.42 16.49 
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Northern Cyprus 11.43 36.59 22.25 29.73 
Netherlands 1.91 45.62 44.44 8.03 
Finland 3.53 37.77 41.67 17.02 
Slovenia 1.76 39.42 45.55 13.27 
Montenegro 9.84 29.04 35.13 25.99 
Ireland 5.18 32.44 42.49 19.90 
Estonia 4.53 31.78 42.66 21.03 
Spain 5.00 29.84 44.69 20.48 
France 2.09 32.57 38.49 26.85 
Moldova 3.82 30.61 44.44 21.13 
Iceland 5.22 28.03 45.10 21.66 
Belgium 1.67 29.84 48.20 20.29 
Portugal 3.24 26.20 36.46 34.10 
Italy 3.98 23.54 41.73 30.75 
Germany 1.51 25.64 51.13 21.72 
Albania 4.58 21.89 39.40 34.13 
Lithuania 0.29 24.44 55.00 20.27 
Romania 5.60 19.07 40.84 34.49 
Ukraine 3.39 21.12 28.74 46.75 
Greece 4.79 18.26 36.11 40.83 
Northern Ireland 2.80 19.83 53.88 23.49 
Poland 1.67 20.19 46.73 31.41 
Czech Republic 3.57 17.63 45.33 33.47 
Latvia 1.84 19.33 45.63 33.20 
Bosnia Herzegovina 4.70 16.09 45.33 33.88 
Great Britain 2.26 16.99 45.92 34.84 
Austria 1.95 16.32 53.21 28.52 
Hungary 1.84 14.97 41.70 41.50 
Serbia 1.45 13.01 49.20 36.33 
Croatia 1.62 12.22 51.59 34.57 
Bulgaria 2.23 11.17 37.40 49.20 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 10. Within-country distributions of responses on confidence in the government, 
European Values Study-2017 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of those 
with “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence) 
 Country a great deal quite a lot not very much none at all 
Azerbaijan 40.87 51.75 6.24 1.14 
Switzerland 9.67 58.95 26.93 4.45 
Norway 7.10 54.68 32.82 5.40 
Belarus 12.26 43.80 29.75 14.19 
Russia 13.06 41.41 28.87 16.67 
Sweden 4.90 49.01 36.89 9.20 
Netherlands 3.20 46.88 41.56 8.35 
Finland 3.99 41.29 42.57 12.15 
Estonia 4.32 40.86 44.52 10.30 
Lithuania 1.10 41.53 47.28 10.09 
Denmark 4.08 36.71 45.29 13.92 
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Austria 4.27 35.89 44.31 15.52 
Hungary 10.84 28.26 31.28 29.63 
Georgia 10.09 27.49 33.53 28.88 
Montenegro 6.93 30.36 39.50 23.21 
Germany 3.19 33.28 47.51 16.01 
Iceland 3.33 29.50 46.16 21.01 
Slovakia 5.34 27.40 43.56 23.70 
France 2.15 30.29 36.01 31.55 
Great Britain 4.34 25.27 50.87 19.51 
Armenia 2.89 23.73 40.44 32.94 
Serbia 5.14 21.18 38.68 35.00 
Poland 5.87 20.34 39.44 34.35 
North Macedonia 5.41 19.80 30.61 44.18 
Italy 3.15 21.10 48.90 26.86 
Spain 4.37 18.49 37.98 39.16 
Bulgaria 3.84 17.78 50.64 27.74 
Romania 3.89 15.29 36.55 44.26 
Czechia 1.86 16.41 51.30 30.43 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.22 14.65 36.38 45.75 
Slovenia 1.72 13.84 56.77 27.67 
Albania 3.09 11.73 28.16 57.02 
Croatia 0.69 8.05 42.47 48.79 




Figure 7. Changes in the country level of confidence in the government between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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Figure 8. Changes in the relative country ranks on confidence in the government between 2008 
and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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0.178 0.127 0.471 0.504 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 12. Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy, EVS-2008 (sorted in 
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Slovak Republic 0.062 





















Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 13. Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy, EVS-2017 (sorted in 
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Great Britain 0.052 
Montenegro 0.051 











Figure 9. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and approval of 
democracy between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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Table 14. Correlations between national pride and evaluation of democracy in one’s own 














































Northern Ireland 0.052 
Northern Cyprus 0.045 
Romania 0.039 
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Bosnia Herzegovina -0.028 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 15. Correlations between national pride and evaluation of democracy in one’s own 

















Great Britain 0.177 
Austria 0.166 




















Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 10. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and evaluation of 
democracy in one’s own country between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
Table 16. Correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country’s political 
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Great Britain 0.086 
Moldova 0.073 
Poland 0.060 







Northern Ireland 0.011 
Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008. 
 
Table 17. Correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country’s political 














Great Britain 0.192 
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North Macedonia 0.138 












Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 11. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and satisfaction with 
a country’s political system between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
 
 
Table 18. Correlations between national pride and confidence in government, EVS-2008 


















Slovak Republic 0.207 
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Northern Ireland 0.143 
Finland 0.139 
Czech Republic 0.136 
Turkey 0.133 














Great Britain 0.039 












Table 19. Correlations between national pride and confidence in government, EVS-2017 
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Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2017. 
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Figure 12. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and satisfaction with 
a country’s political system between 2008 and 2017 
Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values 
Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017. 
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